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Introduction and Background 
 
1.1 Overview 
If someone is offered the choice between receiving $10 today and $15 
today, she will inevitably choose the $15.  However, if the same person chooses 
between receiving $10 today and $15 in a month, she very well may choose the 
$10.  If she does, she has displayed delay discounting – the devaluing of future 
outcomes relative to present outcomes.  The chief aim of this dissertation project 
was to contribute to answering the question: What are the psychological drivers 
of delay discounting behavior?  That is, why do people devalue future outcomes 
in the way that they do?  Despite its apparent importance, little research has 
focused on elucidating the causes of delay discounting behavior.  Most studies to 
date have been concerned with describing the phenomenon rather than 
explaining it.  Thus, the explanatory question was ripe for investigation.   The 
empirical research presented here consists of a suite of studies that tested a 
small number of – at times disparate – accounts for delay discounting.   
 
1.2 Domain of study 
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Delay discounting likely has vast and varied influence on human (and non-
human) behavior.  For the purposes of focus and tractability, I circumscribed a 
portion of the phenomenon as the object of this research.   
First, study was restricted to decisions where one available reward is 
clearly better than the other.  The value of some kinds of rewards depends upon 
an individual‟s tastes and preferences.  However, it is uncontroversial to assert 
that receiving $20 is better than receiving $10.   
 Second, the focus was on human decision making.  The fact that non-
human animals exhibit delay discounting indicates that it is a fundamental 
process.  But evidence suggests that the discounting process in humans is 
unique in critical ways, both because of differences in the effects of the 
magnitude of reward (Green, Myerson, Hold, Slevin, & Estle, 2004; Richards, 
Mitchell, de Wit, & Seiden, 1997), and because of the involvement of the 
prefrontal cortex in human discounting behavior (McClure, Laibson, Loewenstein, 
& Cohen, 2004).   
Third, as the ultimate interest is in natural human behavior, contexts such 
as business or policy decision making where formal tools are used to make 
discounting-relevant decisions were excluded.   
Fourth, study concentrated on decisions where the decider is the intended 
beneficiary.  Decisions made for others, including future generations (e.g., 
Chapman, 2001; Frederick, 2006), were excluded.   
Finally, I focused on decisions involving positive amounts of money.  
While work exists on monetary losses and non-monetary outcomes, the bulk of 
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the existing literature concerns monetary rewards.  Concentrating on this domain 
allowed the investigation to remain manageably straightforward, and allowed me 
to build upon the ideas and discoveries of previous scholars.  There is reason to 
expect that insights from this simple context will generalize to other, more typical 
day-to-day decisions, or, at minimum, provide a framework for investigating these 
more complex decisions.   
So, given all these restrictions, the ultimate question of interest was: Why 
do humans often choose to receive a smaller amount of money that can be 
received sooner over a larger amount of money that can be received later? 
 
1.3 Significance of delay discounting 
The choice between a smaller, sooner reward (henceforth “SS”) and a 
larger, later reward (henceforth “LL”) is likely implicated in many domains beyond 
obvious areas such as credit card use and the failure to save for retirement.  
While delay discounting is often studied using more straightforward monetary 
decisions, the focal construct of delay discounting is thought to be wide-reaching 
in its impacts: Smoking and other drug use, dieting, procrastination, and other 
self-control failures have all been posed to be, at heart, delay discounting issues.  
In these domains, a person arguably chooses between a SS (e.g., the pleasure 
of cigarettes now) and a LL (e.g., good health later in life).  The features of 
monetary delay discounting decisions map onto self-control struggles in 
remarkable ways (Ainslie, 1992), and people with self-control problems devalue 
future monetary rewards faster than other people (discussed in section 2.8).  
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Thus, the relationship of delay discounting behavior to self-control behavior is the 
first reason for the phenomenon‟s significance.   
The second reason is its apparent non-normative or maladaptive nature.  
Why would anyone choose a smaller reward over a larger reward, even if he 
must wait some time to receive the larger reward?  After all, the immediate and 
distant future are equally parts of one‟s life.  It seems both rational and adaptive 
to seek to maximize the quality of one‟s life as a whole.  While some reasons for 
discounting may be rational (such as economic reasons, discussed in section 
2.1, and uncertainty about the future, discussed in section 2.2), discounting 
beyond this appears irrational and harmful to the person.  If delay discounting is 
in fact maladaptive, how has such a behavior been preserved through the course 
of an evolutionary process that tends to select for adaptive behaviors?  As will be 
shown in the subsequent literature review, some proposed explanations for the 
phenomenon paint the behavior as normatively justifiable, while others do not.  
But the apparent maladaptiveness of delay discounting has drawn philosophers, 
economists, and scientists to its study for centuries.  If delay discounting is 
harmful, understanding the mechanisms that underlie it has an important 
practical consequence: This knowledge can be used to inform remedial actions.   
 
1.4 Delay discounting fundamentals 
Before examining the existing literature for hypothesized causes of delay 
discounting, in this section I briefly outline some terminology, methodology, 




1.4.1 Definition of delay discounting 
Delay discounting refers to the devaluing of an outcome because of its 
location in the future. Other researchers have defined delay discounting as giving 
future consequences less weight relative to more immediate consequences (e.g., 
Frederick, 2006).  In a more operationalized sense, delay discounting can be 
construed as the tendency to choose a smaller, sooner reward over a larger, 
later reward.  Other terms for the same concept include “temporal discounting,”  
“intertemporal discounting,”  and “time preference” (though this last term often 
has a more nuanced meaning, cf. Frederick, Loewenstein, & O‟Donoghue, 2003). 
 
1.4.2 Characterizing delay discounting  
Researchers are often interested in the extent to which a person discounts 
future rewards.  In order to capture this, they will often elicit from a person the 
present subjective value of various future rewards – the magnitude of a SS such 
that the person is indifferent between the SS and a particular LL (this is also 
referred to as an indifference point).  If someone equally prefers to receive $60 
today or $100 in a year, his indifference point for $100 in a year is $60.  Further, 
this person is said to discount more than someone whose indifference point in 
the same situation is $80. 
Information of this sort is used to quantitatively characterize the extent to 
which a person discounts.  The way this is done depends upon the mathematical 
function used to describe the way future rewards are devalued over time – the 
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delay discounting function.  Initially, an exponential function was introduced by 
Samuelson (1937).  Samuelson did not intend his formulation to be either 
normative or descriptive, and indicated this explicitly.  Rather, he presented it as 
a simplifying assumption in the context of a larger theoretical demonstration 
about the measurement of utility.  However, over the coming decades, other 
economists used his model in ways that assumed it was normatively and/or 
descriptively valid (Frederick et al., 2003).  The reasons for this are unclear – 
perhaps it was adopted because of the expression‟s similarities to other familiar 
economic concepts, perhaps because of its simplicity.  But, for a long period of 
time, an exponential formulation of the following format was preferred: 
V Ae kD   (1) 
where A is the magnitude of a delayed reward, V is the current subjective value 
of that reward, D is the delay to the delivery of the reward, and k is a free 
parameter.  The k parameter, often called the discount rate, varies with the 
steepness of an individual‟s discounting, with higher k values indicating that 
delayed rewards lose their value more quickly than smaller k values (Green & 
Myerson, 1996).  Note that the exponential discounting function is analogous to 
the formula for continuous compounding interest, which is usually expressed as: 
P Cert    (2) 
where P is the future value of C, the initial deposit, r is the annual interest rate, 
and t is the time in years (Manura, 2005).  But, while compounding interest adds 
value to the original amount as the delay increases, the exponential discounting 
function removes value from the delayed reward as the delay increases.  
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As an example, a person with an annual discount rate of 10% would view 
a $100 reward as being worth $90.48 if it is delayed for one year, worth $81.87 if 
it is delayed for two years, worth $74.08 if it is delayed for three years, and so on.  
Figure 1 illustrates the exponential discount function for this situation. 
 
Figure 1: Exponential discount function for a delayed reward of $100, with a 
discounting rate of 10% annually. 
A key feature of an exponential discounting function is that the delay 
discount rate remains constant over time.  The same discount rate applies to a 
choice between outcomes available today versus next week as well as to a 
choice between outcomes available a year from today versus a year and a week 
from today.  But, as researchers eventually discovered, this is not apparently true 
of actual discounting behavior.  By the 1990s, a great deal of empirical work 
(e.g., many of the contributions to the volume edited by Loewenstein & Elster, 
1992) showed that a hyperbolic function provided a better fit to people‟s 
discounting behavior than an exponential function.  A hyperbolic function 
captures, with a single parameter, the apparent phenomenon that a person‟s 
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discount rate typically decreases as the delay to the reward increases (e.g., 
Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Kirby, 1997), while an exponential function could not do 
this without continuously changing k values.  The hyperbolic discount function is 





     (3) 
where A, V, and D have the same meaning as in the exponential equation.  The k 
variable remains a free parameter, but is no longer considered a “rate”.  
Hyperbolic functions are so named because they are of the form y = 1/x, which 
describes a hyperbola.  Figure 2 compares the exponential and hyperbolic 
discount functions with the same k value.  Note the deceleration of the devaluing 
of the reward over time: The line representing the hyperbolic function becomes 
notably less steep as the delay increases, resembling half of a hyperbola.  
 
Figure 2: Exponential and hyperbolic discount functions for a delayed reward of 
$100, with k = 0.10. 
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 Indeed, much of the early empirical work on delay discounting (e.g., many 
of the contributions to the volume edited by Loewenstein & Elster, 1992) was 
concerned with establishing that a hyperbolic function was a better description of 
people‟s discounting tendencies than the exponential function that was 
previously assumed by economists.  One key feature of a hyperbolic function is 
that it allows for dynamic inconsistency – a preference reversal that occurs 
simply because one‟s relation in time to the available outcomes has changed 
(Ainslie & Haslam, 1992).  For example, one may prefer to receive $15 in a year 
and a week over $10 in a year, but prefer $10 today over $15 in a week.  The 
available outcomes are the same in both cases, simply shifted by a year.  Ainslie 
(1992) and other psychologists argue that this mathematical form captures a 
profound aspect of self-control struggles: constantly resolving to remain strong in 
the face of temptations that will occur in the future, while constantly succumbing 
to present temptations. 
 While the hyperbolic function is widely regarded as a sufficient description 
of delay discounting behavior, some researchers have proposed that a quasi-
hyperbolic function better describes human behavior (e.g., McClure et al., 2004): 
AV D      (3) 
where 0 <  ≤ 1,  ≤ 1, and V, A, and D are the same as in the exponential and 
hyperbolic equations.  When there is no delay (D = 0),  and  are assumed to 
equal 1 so that V = A.  When a delay is introduced,  and  take on non-unity 
values, decreasing the present subjective value of the delayed reward.  The  
parameter is the same for all positive delays, and is meant to capture the special 
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value placed on immediate rewards relative to later rewards.  The  parameter 
raised to the power of D further discounts future rewards to an extent that 
depends upon the delay.  So, for a case where  = 0.8 and  = 0.9, the following 
discounting curve emerges: 
 
Figure 3: Figure 2 with a quasi-hyperbolic discounting curve added,  = 0.8 and  
= 0.9. 
 Note the steep decrease in present subjective value as the delay 
increases from 0 to 1.  A key difference between the quasi-hyperbolic and 
hyperbolic functions is that the former makes this sharp distinction between 
“now” and “not-now”, while the latter does not.  McClure and colleagues (McClure 
et al., 2004; McClure, Ericson, Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007) provided 
evidence that the quasi-hyperbolic function maps onto neural activation during 
discounting tasks in striking ways (to be discussed in section 2.8). 
 
1.4.3 Typical research methods 
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 A small number of methods are used to study the nature of people‟s delay 
discounting behavior (reviewed by Frederick et al., 2003).  Typically, paper-and-
pencil or computer-presented questionnaires are administered, and they are 
nearly always one of two types: fill-in-the-blank, or binary forced choice. In fill-in-
the-blank measures, the participant is given two reward options: in one option, 
the magnitude of and delay to the reward are specified by the experimenter.  In 
the other option, one value (either the magnitude or delay of the second reward, 
but typically the former) is missing.  The participant is asked to fill in the blank in 
such a way that he would be indifferent between the two options (used by, e.g., 
Chapman, 1996; Thaler, 1981).  Here is an example of such an item: 
What number would make this statement true for you? 
“I would equally prefer $10 today or $___ in one month.” 
This method requires only a single question to determine the person‟s 
exponential discounting rate for a particular delay, and only a handful of 
questions to determine his hyperbolic k parameter.  For example, if a person 
responded “$8” to the question above, his exponential discounting rate (k) is .22 
(monthly).  Repeating the above question with varying delays provides a number 
of (V, A, D) triplets that can be used to determine the best-fitting k in the 
hyperbolic discounting equation.   
However, this fill-in-the-blank method is often apparently confusing to 
participants and can lead to inconsistent or nonsensical responses (G. Chapman, 
personal communication, November 30, 2008). Frederick et al. (2003) also report 
concerns with this method: Participants often seem to be applying a simple rule 
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(e.g., “multiply the SS by 2 or 10”) in determining their response, though it seems 
unlikely that their actual preferences rely on such rules.   
 Because of these problems, the favored method in most studies is to use 
a series of binary forced choices between various SS and LL rewards, though 
there are myriad ways to do this.  One common way is to hold some LL constant, 
while increasing or decreasing the SS incrementally, as in Table 1 (used by, e.g., 
Johnson & Bickel, 2002; Madden, Petry, Badger, & Bickel, 1997).  For each pair 
of SS and LL rewards, the participant‟s task is to choose the one they prefer.  
The indifference point can be inferred by observing when the participant switches 
from choosing the SS to choosing the LL (when the SS is decreasing) or vice 
versa (when the SS is increasing).    So, for example, if, when choosing between 
the alternatives in Table 1, a participant initially chooses the SS, and continues to 
do so until the SS is decreased to $85.00, we can infer that his indifference point 
for $100 in six months is somewhere between $92.00 and $85.00, and that 
therefore, his exponential discounting rate is somewhere between 0.027 and 
0.014 (monthly). 
However, using binary forced choices is not ideal for all circumstances.  
Because of the number of questions required to determine the relevant 
parameters, this method may not be appropriate for situations where time is a 
constraint (e.g., when one wants to test the effects of a priming manipulation that 






Pair # SS LL 




















$100 in six 
months 
… … $100 in six 
months 
24 $2.00 now $100 in six 
months 
25 $1.00 now $100 in six 
months 
26 $0.50 now $100 in six 
months 
27 $0.10 now $100 in six 
months 
Table 1: SS and LL components used in a common binary forced choice 
procedure. 
Another method, constructed by Kirby and colleagues (Kirby, Petry, & 
Bickel, 1999), uses a smaller set of pre-specified questions.  Rather than 
determining an indifference point directly, Kirby‟s method uses the participant‟s 
responses to mathematically triangulate in on his discounting rate.  Other 
variations on the use of binary forced choice exist (e.g., computer programs that 
adjust the questions asked based upon the participant‟s previous responses), but 
they rely on the same underlying principles.   
More recently, Li (2008) used some novel methods to assess discounting 
preferences.  In one study, participants were asked how happy they would be 
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with receiving $100 after various delays, making ratings on a 100-point scale 
from 0 = “not happy at all” to 100 = “very happy.”  This method provides an 
analogue of the discounting curve with a small number of easily-understood 
questions.  However, this method has not yet been widely adopted.  Ultimately, 
the best method of assessing delay discounting will depend upon the context and 
its relevant constraints. 
 
1.4.4 Hypothetical versus real rewards 
The vast majority of research on human delay discounting involves asking 
participants to make decisions about hypothetical rewards.  The reasons for this 
are apparent: It is cheaper and easier than providing participants with real 
rewards.  Eliciting a person‟s delay discounting parameter and/or function often 
requires a large number of decisions (usually on the order of 27 to several 
hundred); the cost of actually paying out each of the rewards involved in these 
decisions would be prohibitive.  Additionally, the decisions participants make 
involve, by design, delays.  The logistical issues with the administration of 
delayed rewards are significant. 
The widespread use of hypothetical rewards naturally raises a question: 
Are such decisions representative of people‟s behavior when it comes to real 
rewards?  In other domains of decision making, such as response to risk, 
behavior indeed differs when real versus hypothetical rewards are used 
(reviewed by Madden, Begotka, Raiff, & Kastern, 2003).  Kirby (1997) compared 
the discount rates obtained from studies using hypothetical rewards to studies 
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where one or all participants had one of their choices honored at random with 
real money (“potentially real” rewards).  He concluded that hypothetical rewards 
are discounted less than potentially real rewards, possibly because they “lack the 
motivational properties of real rewards” (p. 67), though he does not speculate 
why motivational properties should lead to more discounting.  However, Kirby 
also acknowledged that the comparison was confounded by the reward amounts 
used in the different studies, so his results may simply be a manifestation of the 
magnitude effect: the well-established finding that rewards of larger magnitude 
are discounted less steeply than rewards of smaller magnitude, all else equal 
(e.g., Green, Fry, & Myerson, 1994; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996).  The magnitude 
effect captures a situation where a person might, for example, prefer $10 today 
over $15 next week, but prefer $150 next week over $100 today.   
Since the Kirby review, several studies have endeavored to directly 
compare discounting of real and hypothetical rewards.  Madden and colleagues 
(2003, 2004) used potentially real rewards, while Lagorio and Madden (2005) 
and Johnson and Bickel (2002) used all-real rewards (where every choice by 
every participant was honored with real money).  All of the studies reported in 
these papers failed to find significant differences in delay discounting between 
real and hypothetical conditions, with two exceptions.  One (of 6) of Johnson and 
Bickel‟s (2002) participants discounted hypothetical rewards more than real 
rewards.  Additionally, Madden et al. (2004) found that the hyperbolic function fit 
data from hypothetical rewards significantly better than data from real rewards. 
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A few other papers purport to bear on the issue as well, but they are 
problematic.  Lane, Cherek, Pietras, and Tcheremissine (2003) used a procedure 
where the delay entailed in the LL was the time until the monetary amount was 
added to a running total on the participant‟s computer screen – not the time until 
the participant actually received the reward.  The rewards were not actually 
delivered until the end of the session. A review by Navarick (2004) argued that 
hypothetical rewards are discounted less than real rewards because of a lack of 
a reinforcement process, but the author based this on a comparison of different 
kinds of rewards (i.e., real video clip rewards versus hypothetical money 
rewards).  Kirby and Marakovic (1995) also contended that discount rates were 
lower for hypothetical rewards.  However, they drew this conclusion from a 
comparison of two studies that used different methodologies.  In the study using 
real rewards, present subjective values were inferred via an auction procedure, 
while in the study using hypothetical rewards, participants were simply asked to 
specify the present subjective value.  Finally, Coller and Williams (1999) found 
effects of real versus hypothetical rewards, but their results were confounded 
with demographic variables such as income.  This is problematic because it is 
known that income is a reliable predictor of discount rates, with lower incomes 
being associated with higher discount rates (e.g., Green, Myerson, Lichtman, 
Rosen, & Fry, 1996; Hausman, 1979; and Kirby et al., 2002).   
Taking all of this research into account, the sensible conclusion seems to 
be that for most purposes, using hypothetical rewards is sufficiently 
representative of behavior with real rewards, in terms of both qualitative and 
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quantitative properties of the phenomenon.  However, the single participant in 
Johnson and Bickel‟s (2002) study whose discount rate was affected by reward 
type indicates that this may not be universal. 
 
1.4.5 Delay discounting versus delay of gratification 
 Before beginning the review of proposed causes for delay discounting in 
the next section, it appears prudent to make explicit the differences between 
delay discounting, and a popular area of study in developmental psychology, 
“delay of gratification.”  It is tempting to take results from the latter area as 
indicative of processes in the former area, but this is not necessarily appropriate. 
 Mischel‟s classic “delay of gratification” paradigm (e.g., Mischel, Ebbesen, 
& Zeiss, 1972; Mischel, Shoda, & Rodriguez, 1989) looks very similar to the 
delay discounting paradigm. In Mischel‟s research, preschool-aged children were 
asked to wait alone in a room until their experimenter returned. They were 
informed that if they waited for the experimenter to return on her own, they would 
receive a larger reward (e.g., two cookies), but if they summoned her back early, 
they would receive a smaller reward (e.g., one cookie).  Mischel and colleagues 
investigated many variables that caused or correlated with longer waiting times.   
 Many of the features of delay of gratification studies and delay discounting 
studies are very similar, including the use of SS and LL rewards.  However, there 
are important distinctions to be made.  Delay discounting research is concerned 
with how people make choices, while delay of gratification research is concerned 
with how people sustain choices.  In delay discounting studies, the participant is 
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not required to make a continuous exertion of self-control, since the choice she 
makes is binding; there is no opportunity to switch from the LL to the SS during 
the delay period.   
Reynolds and Schiffbauer (2005) detail some empirical differences 
between delay discounting and delay of gratification.  The first difference is the 
developmental onset.  Delay-dependent discounting is not seen until 9 or 10 
years of age, while sensitivity to delay time was observed in Mischel‟s preschool 
delay of gratification studies.  Additionally, serotonin (5HT) lesions in rats 
impaired delay of gratification behavior but not discounting behavior.  So, while 
the two paradigms may be similar enough for delay of gratification findings to 
inform delay discounting explanations to some extent, they are sufficiently 















Potential Explanations for Delay Discounting 
 
In this chapter, I review the literature to date for answers to the question, 
“Why does delay discounting occur in humans?” A few characteristics of this 
review are of note: First, it is not assumed that a single factor is responsible for 
the phenomenon or that all hypotheses are mutually exclusive – there could quite 
plausibly be multiple contributors.   
Second, the preparation of this review has revealed the surprising fact that 
the “why” question has received limited attention from researchers.  Most 
theorizing and experimentation on delay discounting has tended to focus on 
demonstrating the phenomenon in different contexts (e.g., among drug users, 
documenting differences in discounting for health versus monetary rewards, etc.) 
or on how to best describe discounting behavior mathematically (e.g., with an 
exponential, hyperbolic, or quasi-hyperbolic function).  Though these results may 
supply some clues about the underlying mechanisms of delay discounting, the 
lack of direct investigation into causation is striking.  Thus, the present review 
draws from such papers only insofar as they inform the question of causation.   
 Third, a large portion of the hypothesizing regarding the causes of delay 
discounting comes from 19th century economists, not modern-day psychologists.  
While the economists‟ proposals are thought-provoking, the unfortunate 
 
20 
consequence of contemporary psychologists‟ neglect of these ideas is that they 
have not been subject to empirical testing or even rigorous theoretical 
specification.  Thus, some proposals that will be presented in this review lack 
both supporting and detracting evidence.  Finally, I aim, in this review, to be 
exhaustive in terms of explanations proposed for delay discounting. 
 
2.1 Economic reasons 
It seems appropriate to first examine whether there are any normatively 
acceptable reasons to devalue future outcomes, and whether such reasons can 
account for any or all of the delay discounting behavior observed.  Most of the 
normative reasons for discounting that have been proposed are economic in 
nature, and fall into three categories: anticipated increase in wealth, possibility of 
intertemporal arbitrage, and possibility of inflation. 
 
2.1.1 Anticipated increase in wealth 
It has been suggested that in at least some situations, a person may 
choose the SS because she believes her wealth will increase over time in such a 
way that the SS taken at the earlier time will provide greater utility than the LL 
taken at the later time (Frederick et al., 2003).  Consider a college senior asked 
to pick between receiving $50 immediately or $200 in a year.  If the student 
presently makes $5000 a year, but anticipates that his income in a year will be 
$35,000, it seems that the student may rationally select the SS on the grounds 
that gaining $50 when one makes $5000 a year would lead to a greater increase 
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in utility or happiness than gaining $200 when one makes $35,000 a year.  To my 
knowledge, no studies have tested this as an explanation for delay discounting 
behavior. 
 
2.1.2 Intertemporal arbitrage 
Another proposal is that people may choose the SS over the LL because 
they think that intertemporal arbitrage is possible (Frederick et al., 2003).  That is, 
a person may believe that by choosing the SS and investing it properly, she 
could end up with more money than the LL by the time she could have received 
the LL.  Economists (e.g., Fuchs, 1982) have proposed that one should have a 
discount rate equal to the market interest rate because of such opportunities.  
Only one empirical paper apparently bears directly on this issue.  In studies by 
Kawashima (2006), participants made decisions about spending and saving 
money in simulated economies.  It was shown that the interest rate of the 
simulated economy affected participants‟ delay discounting rates in the 
appropriate direction. 
2.1.3 Inflation.  A third economic reason why people may devalue future 
rewards is that they anticipate inflation in the relevant economy.    Inflation entails 
that a unit of currency becomes less valuable over time; thus, it seems 
reasonable, given an anticipation of inflation, to choose the SS if one believes 
that the smaller amount consumed at an earlier time would be worth more (i.e., 
could be traded for more goods/services) than the larger reward consumed at a 
later time.  A few studies support this notion: First, Ostaszewski, Green, and 
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Myerson (1998) showed that at a time when inflation was extremely high in 
Poland but not in the U.S., people tended to discount much more when rewards 
were expressed in terms of Polish zlotys than in terms of U.S. dollars.  Second, 
in the simulated-economy studies by Kawashima (2006), the inflation rate 
affected participants‟ delay discounting rates in the appropriate direction.  Finally, 
Takahashi, Masataka, Malaivijitnond, and Wongsiri (2008) showed that an 
unstable currency (the Thai bhat) was discounted more than rice, even though 
the discount rate for food is typically higher than the discount rater for money 
(e.g., Odum, Baumann, & Rimington, 2006). 
 These three economic explanations appear to be reasonable proposals, 
and almost certainly explain the bulk of discounting behavior in formal business 
contexts.  However, it is unclear to what extent these factors drive the 
intertemporal decision making of laypeople in day-to-day life.  While the studies 
reported above imply that economic reasons may contribute to some delay 
discounting behavior, other research makes it apparent that they do not account 
for all of it.   
First, delay discounting behavior occurs when the available rewards are 
separated by minutes or days (e.g., McClure et al., 2007).  In such situations, 
these economic factors are not likely in play in a normative way – anticipated 
increases in wealth, opportunities for intertemporal arbitrage, and anticipated 
inflation should be moot when dealing with such short spans of time.   
Second, these economic reasons make sense only for tradable rewards 
(e.g., money, drugs), but discounting behavior is seen for non-tradable rewards 
 
23 
(small quantities of juice or water that the participant must consume immediately 
upon administration, as used by McClure et al., 2007).  Such non-tradable 
rewards may be subject to concerns about diminishing marginal utility, but 
concerns of inflation or intertemporal arbitrage would be irrelevant (e.g., one 
cannot invest a small quantity of juice that must be consumed immediately).   
Third, observed discounting rates are generally much higher than would 
be justified by economic reasons (Frederick et al., 2003).  Even in Kawashima‟s 
(2006) highly controlled simulated economies, changes in discounting rates 
prompted by changes in inflation and interest rates, although in the appropriate 
directions, were too extreme to be economically justifiable.  One delay 
discounting experiment demonstrated discounting rates as high as one billion 
percent annually (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992) – a rate far greater than one justified 
by economic reasons.  Thus, it is clear that a phenomenon of interest still 
remains when economic factors are unlikely contributors. 
It is possible, however, that overgeneralization or misapplication of 
economic principles could explain irrational delay discounting behavior.  For 
example, perhaps people discount non-tradable rewards because they 
mindlessly overgeneralize principles that apply to tradable rewards.  Such ideas 
have not yet been tested.  
 
2.2 Uncertainty about the future 
Another proposed cause for delay discounting also conceives of 
discounting behavior as potentially normatively defensible. The hypothesis is that 
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discounting occurs because of uncertainty about the future.  That is, people are 
less certain of receiving rewards in the (relatively) distant future than the 
immediate future, and thus devalue rewards accordingly.   The uncertainty 
hypothesis essentially proposes that delay discounting is, at heart, probability 
discounting, the devaluing of outcomes as they become less probable.  
Probability discounting does not appear to itself require explanation, since it is 
evidently quite sensible.  The uncertainty hypothesis was first proposed by the 
economist Rae (1834), who observed, “When engaged in safe occupations and 
living in healthy countries, men are much more apt to be frugal, than in 
unhealthy, or hazardous occupations, and in climates pernicious to human life” 
(p. 57). 
This uncertainty about the future could manifest itself in different ways: 
people may not believe the LL will be delivered, for example, or they may not be 
certain they will even be alive to receive it.  Further, it is not necessary that this 
uncertainty be conscious.  Some researchers (Critchfiled & Atteberry, 2003; 
Kacelnik, 2003) propose that humans evolved in an environment where future 
rewards were often no longer available when delivery was anticipated.  In an 
environment like this, a mechanism (specifically, discounting the value of future 
rewards) may have evolved to cope with this fact.  Such an evolved mechanism 
may affect a person‟s behavior on a non-conscious level despite the person‟s 
conscious beliefs, even in an environment (e.g., a laboratory) where future 
rewards are relatively certain.  As Kacelnik (2003) puts it, “…although animals in 
the laboratory ought not to discount at all, if they do so it is because they respond 
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to the ghost of uncertainty in their environment of evolutionary adaptation” (p. 
119).  The evolutionary sensibility of this hypothesis adds to its appeal.  (Little 
empirical evidence, though, is available to support this evolutionary account.  The 
only relevant study seems to be Critchfield & Atteberry‟s, 2003, demonstration 
that people with higher discounting rates fare better in a simulated group foraging 
task.) 
 Beyond theoretical appeal, a variety of empirical support for the 
uncertainty hypothesis is available.  First, the same functional form (hyperbolic) 
appears to provide the best fit for both delay discounting and probability 
discounting data (Green & Myerson, 2004; Rachlin, Raineri, & Cross, 1991).  
That is, the same type of mathematical function is used to describe the way 
people devalue outcomes as time to delivery increases or probability of delivery 
decreases.  While this obviously does not prove that the two types of discounting 
are the same process, it is tantalizing support for that notion.   
 Second, people report feeling less certain that they will receive more 
delayed rewards when they are explicitly asked to make such judgments: In 
studies by Patak and Reynolds (2007) and Reynolds, Patak, and Shroff (2007), 
participants were asked to report how certain they were of receiving rewards 
after various delays.  The reported certainty decreased as the delay to reward 
increased.  However, these results must be interpreted with caution, as demand 
effects may have been a factor in participants‟ responses.  That is, participants 
may have assumed, upon being asked to repeatedly rate how certain they felt of 
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receiving a reward after increasing delays, that their ratings of certainty “ought” to 
change with the length of the delay. 
Third, some researchers propose that delay and probability are 
interchangeable when it comes to decision making, and take this to imply that 
delay discounting arises from the more fundamental and normatively 
understandable probability discounting (however, a minority of researchers, e.g., 
Rachlin et al., 1991, believe that the converse is true: that probability discounting 
arises from the more fundamental delay discounting. But since the aim of this 
dissertation is to understand the causes of delay discounting, arguments taking 
delay discounting as fundamental will not be explored in depth).  Rachlin et al. 
(1991) examined the ways in which people discounted based upon delay or 
probability and determined a constant of proportionality that would allow one to 
convert delays into “equivalent” probabilities or vice versa.  That is, knowing the 
constant of proportionality would allow one to find the probability x such that a 
person would be indifferent between receiving $1000 for sure in five years and 
receiving $1000 immediately with probability x (in Rachlin et al.‟s study, x was 
50%).  Yi, Piedad, and Bickel (2006) found this constant of proportionality to be 
an accurate predictor of choices and argued that delay and probability can 
effectively be combined into a single metric for decision making purposes.   
Along these lines, Prelec and Loewenstein (1991) pointed out that delay 
discounting and probability discounting processes demonstrate analogous 
anomalies: the immediacy and certainty effects, respectively.  The immediacy 
effect describes the extra significance deciders attach to immediate outcomes: 
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The difference between now and one day from now carries decidedly more 
psychological weight than the difference between two days from now and three 
days from now.  A parallel effect, the certainty effect, occurs in probability 
discounting: The difference between 100% probability and 90% probability is 
subjectively weighted more heavily than the difference between 90% and 80% 
(cf. prospect theory, e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1981).  Keren and Roelofsma 
(1995) and Weber and Chapman (2005) expanded this idea by demonstrating 
that adding explicit uncertainty to the SS can reduce or eliminate the immediacy 
effect, and adding delay to probabilistic outcomes can reduce or eliminate the 
certainty effect.  This work provides further evidence for the idea that delay and 
uncertainty can be substituted for one another.  Finally, Todorov, Goren, and 
Trope (2007) showed that decreasing the probability of an event causes people 
to think of the event in more abstract terms in the same way that increasing the 
temporal distance to the event does (this idea will be expanded upon in section 
2.4).   
 Despite this wealth of supporting evidence, there is also compelling 
evidence against the uncertainty hypothesis.  First, and most detrimental, is the 
observation that increasing the amounts of the rewards between which a person 
is choosing has opposite effects on delay discounting and probability discounting 
(Du, Green, & Myerson, 2002; Green & Myerson, 2004; Holt, Green, & Myerson, 
2003; Yi et al., 2006).  Increasing the magnitude of the rewards decreases the 
discounting rate based upon delay, but increases the discounting rate based 
upon probability.  At present, there are no proposed accounts for why this occurs.  
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This appears to be a major obstacle to the theory that delay discounting and 
probability discounting arise from the same underlying mechanism.   
 Second, if delay discounting and probability discounting are ultimately the 
same process, one expects that the two discounting rates would be highly 
correlated within individuals.  However, while some sources report some degree 
of correlation between the two rates (e.g., Richards, Zhang, Mitchell, & de Wit, 
1999), other studies that have examined the question report no significant 
correlation between individuals‟ delay and probability discounting rates (e.g., 
Ohmura, Takahashi, Kitamura, & Wehr, 2006; Olson, Hooper, Collins, & Luciana, 
2007).   
One might also suppose that, if the uncertainty hypothesis holds, 
probability and delay discounting would be associated within certain groups: that 
if people in a certain group discount delayed rewards relative to another group, 
they would also discount probabilistic rewards more.  However, a cross-cultural 
study performed by Du et al. (2002) showed among Chinese and Japanese 
graduate students, the Chinese showed higher delay discounting, but the 
Japanese showed higher probability discounting.  Similarly, Holt et al. (2003) 
demonstrated that college students who gamble had lower probability 
discounting rates than college students who do not gamble, but the two groups 
had comparable delay discounting rates.  Finally, Olson et al. (2007) showed that 
older adolescents show less delay discounting than younger adolescents, but no 
difference in probability discounting was observed.  It must be noted, however, 
that these sorts of comparisons between groups should be taken only as a 
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suggestive – not conclusive – blow against the uncertainty hypothesis.  A 
difference between groups on one discounting rate but not the other could be 
due to group differences in how much uncertainty is associated with various 
delays.  For example, it could plausibly be the case that younger people feel that 
uncertainty increases dramatically with delay, while older people think that 
uncertainty increases only slightly with delay.  If this were true, the groups could 
agree on how probability alone should affect value (i.e., they have identical 
probability discounting rates), but still have very different delay discounting rates. 
 Overall, the case for the uncertainty hypothesis is mixed, with 
compelling evidence on both sides.  It is clear that further investigation is 
required to construct a coherent account that accommodates all the relevant 
evidence.   
 
2.3 Pain of abstinence 
A third proposed account for delay discounting behavior, in contrast with 
some other accounts, does not assume that the future outcome is valued less 
because of its temporal location.  Instead, the theory, first suggested by the 
economists Rae (1834) and Senior (1936), proposes that it is painful to deny the 
receipt of good things, and people choose the smaller, sooner reward to avoid or 
end this pain.  According Loewenstein‟s (1992) analysis of Senior‟s ideas, Senior 
viewed interest as “compensation to the holder of capital for enduring the pain of 
abstaining from consumption, which he viewed as „among the most painful 
exertions of human will‟” (p. 8). 
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Unfortunately, though, there is no empirical work that directly tests this 
hypothesis in the delay discounting domain.  There is, however, some peripheral 
evidence that may bear on these ideas.  The first type of evidence involves 
viewing delay discounting choices as requiring self-control; discussion of this 
work will be reserved for section 2.8.  The second type of evidence is found in 
work on delay of gratification.  Loewenstein (1992) proposes that some of 
Mischel‟s work (e.g., Mischel, 1974) provides support for the “pain of abstinence” 
hypothesis.  Mischel and colleagues found that teaching their preschool-age 
participants to engage in distracting thoughts during the waiting period increased 
the chances that the participants would wait for the larger reward.  Loewenstein 
takes this to mean that the distracting thoughts decrease the pain of waiting, 
thereby allowing the child to wait for the larger reward.  The validity of this 
interpretation, though, is not clear.  Distraction may do more than alleviate pain, 
including causing the child to forget that there is a choice to be made.  This 
would cause her to “choose” to wait for the larger reward by default (Yates & 
Revelle, 1979).   
Further results from delay of gratification research could be taken as 
support for the pain of abstinence hypothesis: when the physical rewards were 
present in front of the child during the waiting period, wait times were significantly 
shorter than when the rewards were not present (Mischel & Ebbesen, 1970; 
Yates & Revelle,1979).  Having the rewards present would arguably increase the 
pain of waiting.  However, as discussed in section 1.4.5, the “delay of 
gratification” paradigm differs from typical “delay discounting” decision paradigms 
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in major ways.  In delay discounting situations, the “pain of waiting” would occur 
in a period during which the decision could not be reversed.  So, if pain of waiting 
is driving people to choose the SS, it must be the anticipated pain of waiting.  
But, it is unclear how accurate such anticipations would be (e.g., mothers 
incorrectly predicted that encouraging their child to think about the LL during the 
waiting period would increase the child‟s waiting time; Hom & Knight, 1996). 
One obstacle this hypothesis faces is that it is unclear when and why 
waiting for a larger reward is aversive rather than pleasurable.  Sometimes, 
anticipation of future rewards is pleasurable, and in at least some decision 
situations, people choose to delay a pleasurable event (e.g., a kiss from a 
favorite movie star), presumably to allow time for pleasant anticipation 
(Loewenstein, 1987).   In other situations, though, awaiting future rewards is 
clearly aversive.  Some researchers have made headway in addressing this 
issue.  Lovallo and Kahneman (2000) demonstrated that people are more willing 
to delay the resolution of attractive versus unattractive gambles.  Hoch and 
Loewenstein (1991) proposed that pain of waiting occurs when the decider has 
adapted to having the LL before they possess it.  So, if I plan on buying a new 
laptop, at first my reference point is at “not having new laptop,” so I am waiting 
for a gain (getting the laptop).  But, if I adapt to the state of having the laptop 
before I get it, such that my reference point is at “having a new laptop,” I am 
instead experiencing a loss while waiting for the laptop.   
Additionally, they detailed factors that they believe can exacerbate the 
pain of waiting, such as physical or temporal proximity to the LL or social 
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comparison, but these have not yet received empirical attention.  However, a 
richer answer to the question of when and why waiting for a reward is painful 
would be required for the “pain of waiting” theory to be a viable account of delay 
discounting.   
 
2.4 Differences in construal (Construal Level Theory) 
A third proposed cause of delay discounting is suggested by proponents 
of Construal Level Theory (CLT) (e.g., Trope & Liberman, 2003).  Ultimately, the 
idea is that people conceive of the SS in relatively concrete terms, while they 
conceive of the LL in relatively abstract terms.  If this concrete construal of the 
SS is more appealing than the abstract construal of the LL, the SS is chosen. 
Some background on CLT is necessary:  CLT does not deal specifically 
with delay discounting, rather, it concerns the way people think about events in 
the near and far future.  The core of CLT is that people think of events in the far 
future in relatively abstract, high-level, simple terms, whereas they think of 
imminent events in relatively concrete, low-level, complex terms.  CLT‟s 
proponents propose that these differences in construal are a generalized 
heuristic that arises because there are differences in what people usually know 
about events in the near or far future (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  One typically 
only knows central, high-level information about events in the distant future, and 
the concrete details only emerge when the event becomes imminent.  Thus, 
experiences may build an association between construal level and temporal 
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distance, and this association may be overgeneralized to situations where one 
has the same sort of information about near- and far- future events.   
In a typical CLT study, Liberman and Trope (1998) found that when 
people imagine the event “locking the door,” they tend to describe it in a high-
level manner as “securing the house” if the imagined event is occurring in the 
distant future, but prefer to describe it in a low-level manner as “putting a key in a 
lock and turning it” if the imagined event is occurring in the immediate future.  
Trope, Liberman, and colleagues have provided a wealth of experimental 
evidence to support CLT (e.g., Liberman, Sagristano, & Trope, 2002; Liberman & 
Trope, 1998; Trope & Liberman, 2000; Trope, Liberman, & Wakslak, 2007). 
While no studies have directly tied CLT to delay discounting behavior, 
proponents of CLT argue that CLT may be a viable explanation for the 
phenomenon.  Delay discounting behavior could occur, they argue, in situations 
where the lower-level construal of the SS is more positive/desirable than the 
higher-level construal of the LL.  It is plausible that lower-level construals of 
rewards are more appealing than higher-level construals, since lower-level 
construals entail more emotional and motivational qualities (Trope & Liberman, 
2003).  For example, a lower-level construal of food might entail the food‟s taste, 
smell, and texture, while a higher-level construal might entail its nutritional value.  
This could also be the case for money, with a lower-level construal entailing 
exactly how the money might be used. 
They further propose that CLT could explain the magnitude effect, 
contending that people naturally think about large rewards (e.g., $10,000) in 
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more high-level, abstract ways than small rewards (e.g., $10), because larger 
rewards are typically associated with more essential, high-level, and distant 
goals.  So, choosing among large rewards elicits less concrete thinking about the 
LL and hence less discounting (Trope & Liberman, 2003). 
Unfortunately, though, no CLT studies have involved asking participants to 
choose between a SS and LL.  CLT studies typically involve asking people to 
choose between qualitatively different options for which ultimate relative value is 
difficult to assess (e.g., a difficult but interesting assignment versus an easy but 
boring assignment).  CLT studies also typically involve choices among options 
that would be experienced at the same point of time – that is, people choose 
among options to be experienced in the near future, or people choose among 
options to be experienced in the distant future.  CLT studies have not asked 
people to make decisions between near-future experiences pitted against far-
future experiences, the core of standard delay discounting decision problems. 
So, while the ideas of CLT have been borne out by a good deal of 
experimental data, its usefulness as an explanation for classic delay discounting 
behavior is unclear.  What would high-level and low-level construals of money 
be, for example?  Despite the lack of direct evidence bearing on CLT‟s 
applicability to delay discounting, this appears to be fertile ground for future 





 Another account of delay discounting apparently is discussed in only a 
single paper (Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2001). The authors argue that “one 
reason why decision makers prefer immediate gains is because they are 
optimistic that these gains will be followed by additional gains in the future” (p. 
173).  The authors based this theory upon previous work which suggested that 
people often believe that future losses can be avoided, and extended these 
results to propose a sort of broad optimism that includes believing that early 
gains will be followed by additional gains. 
For an example, consider a scenario used in their Study 1: The participant 
is asked to choose between a (hypothetical) SS bonus and a LL bonus at his job.  
According to the optimism hypothesis, the person may be inclined to choose the 
SS because he believes that the small bonus could be followed by further 
bonuses (in the time period before the LL would have been received), or that he 
could take the SS bonus, switch jobs, and be offered new bonuses at his new 
job.   The authors manipulated optimism in this scenario by telling participants in 
the “low optimism” condition that no bonuses would follow, and that they were 
under a contract that would not allow them to change jobs for a long period of 
time.  Participants in this condition showed an increased preference for the LL 
relative to control participants who were not given this additional information.  
Unfortunately, though, the optimism manipulation was confounded with a 
certainty manipulation.  Participants in the low optimism condition were also 
assured that the LL would, in fact, be received (i.e., that the company they work 
for is financially sound, and that they themselves are in excellent health).  
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According to the uncertainty hypothesis, information like this would also increase 
preference for the LL.  So, while the optimism hypothesis is novel and somewhat 
plausible, it has not yet been adequately tested.1 
 
2.6 Intrapersonal empathy gap 
 Nineteenth century economist Böhm-Bawerk proposed that delay 
discounting arises from a failure to adequately imagine future needs or wants.  
That is, discounting occurs because of a failure to empathize with one‟s future 
self.  This lack of intrapersonal empathy may stem from something akin to 
Tversky and Kahneman‟s (e.g., 1973) “availability” (Loewenstein, 1992).  Böhm-
Bawerk (1888) phrased it like this:  
It may be that we possess inadequate power to imagine and to abstract, or that 
we are not willing to put forth the necessary effort, but in any event we limn a 
more or less incomplete picture of our future wants and especially of the remotely 
distant ones. (p. 269) 
 The term “intrapersonal empathy gap” is borrowed from the affective 
forecasting literature.  Scholars in this literature have proposed that people 
incorrectly predict their own future emotions because of a failure to empathize 
with their future selves, again, due to something like differences in availability.  
Certain manipulations that encourage a person to think carefully about her future 
life (e.g., asking people to predict how they would spend their time on a particular 
day in the future, as implemented by Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, & 
                                                 
1
 A study, not reported in this dissertation, was performed that de-confounded the uncertainty and 
optimism factors in the study by Berndsen & van der Pligt, 2001.  We found that manipulating 
optimism-related but not uncertainty-related information did not change discounting behavior 
relative to a control group. 
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Axsom, 2000) have been successful in bridging this intrapersonal empathy gap, 
decreasing affective forecasting errors.  It would be informative to see if similar 
manipulations could also decrease delay discounting behavior.   
Some results consistent with the intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis 
are available: Adams and Nettle (2009) showed that people who report habitually 
thinking about the future (per the Zimbardo Time Perspective Inventory, 
Zimbardo & Boyd, 1999) or regularly considering future consequences (per the 
Consideration of Future Consequences scale, Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & 
Edwards, 1994) discount less than other people.  Another provocative clue 
comes from analogous phenomena found in delay discounting and affective 
forecasting work: Gilbert, Gill, and Wilson (2002) showed that working memory 
load increased affective forecasting errors, while Hinson et al. (2003) showed 
that working memory load increased delay discounting.  This suggests that 
similar mechanisms may underlie the two phenomena. 
 
2.7 Other theories 
For the sake of being historically exhaustive, two further theories are 
discussed here, though they have received little attention in the literature and are 
likely regarded as too theoretically vague for serious empirical study.   
 
2.7.1 Present utility  
One proposed explanation for the phenomenon that does not rely on the 
devaluation of future outcomes was proposed by the economist Jevons (1871), 
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who suggested that people do not consider future utility at all when making 
intertemporal decisions.  Rather, they consider only present utility.  If the utility 
from anticipating the LL outweighs the utility from obtaining the SS, the decider 
will choose the LL.  Otherwise, he will choose the SS.  It is apparent that this 
hypothesis is a vast departure from other theories of delay discounting, which 
typically posit that future utility is a consideration. 
This theory lacks both supporting and detracting data, and is arguably 
rather unclearly specified.  How could it be determined whether someone is 
considering future utility or anticipation?  How is “anticipation” defined?  Further, 
as previously noted, it is unclear when waiting for future rewards is pleasurable 
rather than painful.   
 
2.7.2 Future self as other 
It has been argued that discounting (beyond what can be justified because 
of accurate beliefs about economic factors or uncertainty) is irrational because 
the present and future are equally parts of one‟s life, and failing to choose the 
larger reward (even if it will be received later in time) would reduce the quality of 
one‟s life as a whole (Frederick, 2003).  But, as Frederick (2003) comments: 
The belief that a person should weight all utility the same, regardless of its 
temporal position, implicitly assumes that all parts of one‟s future are equally 
parts of oneself; that there is a single, enduring, irreducible entity to whom all 
future utility can be ascribed. (p. 90)   
One unusual proposed explanation for discounting behavior suggests that 
there is not a single, enduring “self,” and thus discounting the outcomes for one‟s 
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future self is as sensible as discounting the outcomes for another person entirely 
(Parfit, 1971, 1984).  Consider the view of the philosopher Parfit (1984): “My 
concern for my future may correspond to the degree of connectedness between 
me now and myself in the future…since connectedness is nearly always weaker 
over long periods, I can rationally care less about my further future” (p. 313). 
Frederick (2003) reports an experiment designed to test this idea.  If 
Parfit‟s hypothesis is correct, he argues, one would expect that a person who 
imagines her future self to be very different (in terms of “personality, 
temperament, likes and dislikes, beliefs, values, ambitions, goals, ideals, etc.,” p. 
95) from her present self would have a higher discount rates than a person who 
supposes that her present and future selves would be highly connected.  No 
correlation was found between anticipated future similarity and discount rates.  
Thus, according to Frederick‟s operationalization of Parfit‟s ideas, the “future self 
as other” account of delay discounting behavior does not stand up to empirical 
examination. 
 
2.8 New explanation: Dual-system competition 
The preparation of this literature review has suggested a new account of 
delay discounting.  While hints of this account have appeared in existing 
literature, this account has not been explicitly proposed.  The hypothesis is that 
discounting behavior results from competition between two different cognitive 
systems, with a faster, more automatic system favoring the SS.  The LL is only 
chosen if a more deliberative system can effortfully override this initial impulse. 
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“Dual systems” views of cognition have received a great deal of attention 
in the last decade (e.g., Epstein, 1994; Evans, 2008; Kahneman, 2003).  Though 
different researchers have conceived of the systems differently (e.g., 
“experiential vs. rational” systems, “System 1 vs. System 2,” “hot vs. cold” 
systems, etc.) and used different research methodologies, there is a fair amount 
of evidence for two qualitatively different cognitive systems that operate in 
parallel, with one system (System 1) operating quickly and automatically, relying 
heavily on emotional and associative information, while the other (System 2) is 
slower and deliberate, operating in a more logical/rational manner.   While this 
idea has rarely been discussed explicitly (though Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999, 
explicitly discuss the hypothesis with respect to delay of gratification), some 
research on delay discounting has hinted that two cognitive (and, perhaps, 
neural) systems may value rewards differently, with System 1 putting a high 
value on immediate receipt, and System 2 valuing outcomes more independently 
of temporal location.  A good deal of empirical evidence is consistent with the 
idea that the automatic reaction to a delay discounting problem is to take the SS, 
and that the LL is chosen only if this initial reaction is countered by the more 
deliberate cognitive system. 
There are two potential mechanisms that could underlie this process, but it 
is presently unclear exactly how theoretically distinct or mutually exclusive they 
are.  Further, most of the relevant evidence can be interpreted in terms of either 
mechanism.  According to one mechanism, delay discounting occurs when 
System 1 is relatively more activated than System 2.  Discounting would be 
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increased as the relative activation of System 1 is increased (Li, 2008; Metcalfe & 
Mischel, 1999).  According to another mechanism, resisting the urge to discount 
requires the use of self-control (Li, 2008), which is thought to be a limited 
resource (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  “Using up” self-control on an unrelated 
task would increase delay discounting in subsequent decisions.  For the moment, 
no attempt will be made to differentiate between these two mechanisms; rather, 
support for the overarching idea of dual-systems competition is considered. 
The empirical support for the dual-systems competition hypothesis is 
varied.  First, some evidence (albeit circumstantial) is found in the fact that 
people with self-control problems, such as smokers (e.g., Chession & Viscusi, 
2000; Jaroni, Wright, & Lerman, 2004), pathological gamblers (e.g., Alessi & 
Petry, 2003), problem drinkers (e.g., Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), and heroin 
addicts (e.g., Madden et al., 1997) have higher delay discounting rates than 
normal controls.  If self-control ability (which could be framed as the ability of 
System 2 to override System 1) is a trait of individuals, the fact that people who 
have demonstrated deficits in self-control discount more is suggestive of a 
relationship between self-control and delay discounting.   
Second, rewards that can be directly consumed such as food and alcohol 
(for college students with no substance, gambling, or eating problems; Odum et 
al., 2006) as well as drugs such as heroin (among heroin addicts; Madden et al., 
1997) have been shown to be discounted more than money, which cannot be 
directly consumed.  As it is plausible that directly consumable rewards cause 
relatively more activation of the “hot” system than non-directly consumable 
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rewards, these results could be viewed as evidence that delay discounting 
involves competing cognitive systems. 
Third, and somewhat related to this, exposure to appetitive stimuli such as 
pictures of desserts, the smell of baking cookies (both Li, 2008), or pictures of 
attractive women (for male participants; Wilson & Daly, 2003) increases delay 
discounting behavior for money, a presumably non-appetitive reward.  It is 
plausible that the appetitive stimuli increased the relative activation of the “hot” 
system or decreased the ability of the “cold” system to override impulses to 
discount (e.g., through the depletion of a finite supply of self-control, cf. Muraven 
& Baumeister, 2000). 
Fourth, Hinson, Jameson, and Whitney (2003) demonstrated that taxing 
working memory in various ways led to higher discounting rates.  Working 
memory load is generally believed to interfere with processes that require 
cognitive control, making overriding initial response impulses less successful 
(e.g., Lavie, 2005).  If delay discounting decisions result from dual-system 
competition, working memory load should allow the decisions of the more 
automatic system to be executed more readily.  The fact that higher discounting 
rates were observed under working memory load implies that the automatic 
response is biased toward the SS. 
Fifth, some evidence from the delay of gratification paradigm appears to 
bear on the hypothesis.  Mischel and Baker (1975) found that children could 
learn to increase their delay time by thinking about food rewards in non-
 
43 
consummatory ways (e.g., imagining that a pretzel is a log).  Such thinking could 
be viewed as reducing the activation of the hot system.   
Sixth, preschool age participants in whom a negative mood was induced 
showed more delay discounting than participants in a positive or neutral mood 
(Moore, Clyburn, & Underwood, 1976).  According to ego depletion theory, the 
regulation of a negative mood requires the use of self-control, while positive or 
neutral moods do not (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000). 
The final, and perhaps most compelling, evidence comes from McClure 
and colleagues, who showed that different neural systems in humans seem to 
value immediate and delayed rewards differently, for both money (McClure et al., 
2004) and juice rewards (McClure et al., 2007).  They found that activation of 
parts of the limbic system (i.e., neural areas associated with reward and emotion) 
was relatively high when the decision problem included an immediate reward, but 
parts of the prefrontal and parietal cortex (i.e., neural areas associated with 
planning and deliberation) were activated regardless of when the rewards could 
be received.  Further, it was shown that when people chose the LL, there was 
significantly more activation in prefrontal and parietal areas than in the limbic 
areas, but when the SS was chosen, activity in the two areas was comparable.  
Additionally, McClure et al. (2007) showed that the relative activation of the two 
areas predicted actual choice behavior. 
 While no evidence from the delay discounting literature apparently 
contradicts the dual-systems competition hypothesis, some work in the delay of 
gratification arena is potentially inconsistent.  Mischel and Baker (1975) found 
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that instructing participants to think in consummatory ways about foods that were 
very different from the reward food would increase wait time.  Metcalfe and 
Mischel (1999) generalize this to posit that “external distraction that activates 
irrelevant hot spots” should increase wait time (p. 11).  These ideas are at odds 
with the present hypothesis, which would predict that such stimulation would 
cause a general activation of the hot system, thereby increasing delay 






















 In this section, I discuss the empirical work I undertook to elucidate the 
drivers of delay discounting.  The studies are organized in the order in which they 
were executed, as results from earlier studies informed the design of later 
studies. 
 
3.1 Study 1: Inducing concrete construals I: What would you do? 
3.1.1 Overview  
Study 1 was designed to test two hypotheses about the relationship 
between Construal Level Theory (CLT) and delay discounting.  The first 
hypothesis is: differences in how the SS and LL are construed drive delay 
discounting.  As discussed in section 2.4, CLT states that sooner events are 
represented in relatively concrete terms, while later events are represented in 
relatively abstract terms.  One potential explanation for why people would choose 
the SS over the LL for positive outcomes is that the concrete construal of the SS 
is more desirable than the abstract construal of the LL, possibly because of the 
motivating affective content of low-level construals.  It follows that causing people 
to think of the SS more abstractly or to think of the LL more concretely should 
lead to less delay discounting behavior – at least in cases where the SS and LL 
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have similar abstract and concrete construals (e.g., when the SS and LL 
are both amounts of money).  The reasoning is that if the SS and LL are 
construed of in a similar way (both abstractly or both concretely), the difference in 
construal level would not drive the decision.  Presumably, the difference in the 
amounts of the rewards then would drive the decision, leading people to choose 
the LL.  So, one goal of this study was to cause one group of participants to 
construe both the SS and LL concretely, and observe whether this group 
discounted less than a control group.  If the manipulation resulted in less delay 
discounting behavior, this would indicate that CLT may be a viable contributor to 
such behavior.   
The second hypothesis of interest in this study was: CLT explains the 
magnitude effect in delay discounting.  As discussed in section 1.4.4, smaller 
delayed rewards are discounted more than larger delayed rewards, though there 
is no consensus on why this occurs.  It has been proposed that the magnitude 
effect could be a result of difference in construal level: Making decisions about 
larger (vs. smaller) amounts of money may activate more abstract (vs. concrete) 
construals, which would lead to less delay discounting (Trope & Liberman, 2003).  
Thus, in this study, some participants chose among relatively large rewards, 
while others chose among relatively small rewards.  Then, participants completed 
a measure designed to assess their construal level.  If those choosing among 
larger amounts of money did indeed engage in more high-level construal, this 
would be evidence that CLT is a viable explanation for the magnitude effect. 
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While it has been proposed that CLT can account for delay discounting 
behavior and the magnitude effect (Trope & Liberman, 2003, discussed in 
section 2.4), this has never been directly tested.  The present study was an 
attempt to do just that. 
 
3.1.2 Method 
 3.1.2.1 Participants.  One hundred thirty-six students in the Introductory 
Psychology Subject Pool at the University of Michigan participated in the study 
for class credit.   
 3.1.2.2 Procedure.   All participants made a single decision between a 
hypothetical SS that could be received “today” and a hypothetical LL that could 
be received “one year from today.”  The nature of this decision varied by 
condition.  This study involved two manipulations crossed to produce four 
conditions; each participant was randomly assigned to one condition.  The first 
manipulation was designed to cause participants to think of both the SS and LL 
in concrete terms before making their decision (the “prompt” condition).  These 
participants were presented with the decision that they would be asked to make, 
and then instructed: 
Before you make your choice, we would like you to consider some things.   
Think about the [SS] you could choose to receive today.  Name 3 things you could do 
with this [SS]. 
Think about the [LL] you could choose to receive in one year.  Name 3 things you could 
do with this [LL]. 
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The order of these prompts was randomized between participants.  The values of 
the SS and LL were filled in as dictated by the other manipulation.  After the 
participants listed three things for each prompt, they were asked to indicate their 
choice of the SS or LL.  Participants in the “no prompt” condition did not receive 
these prompts and simply indicated their choice of the SS or LL. 
 The second manipulation varied the amounts of the SS and LL.  In the 
“small rewards” condition, participants chose between a SS of $68 and a LL of 
$100.  In the “large rewards” group, participants chose between a SS of $22,750 
and a LL of $25,000 (the selection of these reward amounts is discussed below 
in section 3.1.2.3). 
 After choosing the SS or LL, all participants indicated the strength of their 
preference by moving a slider to a point on a continuous scale that ranged from “I 
am indifferent between the two options” and “I strongly prefer the option I chose.” 
 Finally, all participants completed a subset of the Behavior Identification 
Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989).  This questionnaire was designed to 
measure whether the participants were engaging in high-level (i.e., abstract) or 
low-level (i.e., concrete) construal.  The BIF asks participants to choose whether 
each of twenty-five actions (e.g., “pushing a doorbell) is, in the participant‟s 
opinion, better described by a low-level description (e.g., “moving a finger”) or a 
high-level description (“seeing if someone is home”).  This scale has been used 
an indication of participants‟ construal level (e.g., Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 
2008; Liberman & Trope, 1998).  As in these previous uses, we excluded six 
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questions that referred to actions in which college students would be unlikely to 
engage (e.g., “joining the army,” “growing a garden”). 
 3.1.2.3 Choice of stimuli.  The delay of one year used in the delay 
discounting question was chosen to be congruent with both existing delay 
discounting studies and CLT studies.  In 10 of 14 CLT studies reviewed, the 
delay used was one year.  The magnitudes of the SS and LL rewards were 
chosen based upon data from Green, Myerson, and McFadden (1997), who 
demonstrated the magnitude effect in a college student population for 
hypothetical rewards.   They showed that the rate of delay discounting decreased 
as the LL increased, until the LL reached about $25,000.  Thus, $25,000 was 
chosen for the larger LL while the smallest amount used by Green et al. (1997), 
$100, was chosen for the smaller LL.  The SS rewards were based upon the 
median discount rates provided by Green et al. (1997) for each LL.  The SS/LL 
choice pairs were designed so that without any manipulation, participants would 
be, on average, indifferent between the SS and LL.   
 
3.1.3 Results 
 3.1.3.1 Excluded participants.  Eight participants were excluded for failing 
to complete the prompt when requested.   
3.1.3.2 Scoring.  The decision and preference rating given by each 
participant were translated into a “discounting score” from -100 to 100.  A score 
of -100 indicates that the participant shows minimal discounting (i.e., the 
participant strongly favors the LL).  A score of 0 indicates that the participant is 
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indifferent between the SS and LL.  A score of 100 indicates that the participant 
shows maximal discounting (i.e., the participant strongly favors the SS).  This 
discounting score was used as a proxy for the participant‟s discounting rate 
(similar techniques were used by Li, 2008).   
3.1.3.2 Effect of concreteness prompt on discounting.  A Mann-Whitney U 
test was used to compare the prompt and no-prompt groups since the 
discounting scores were non-normally distributed.  Among participants who 
chose between small rewards, those receiving the concreteness prompt had 
significantly lower discounting scores ( x = 6.04) than those not receiving a 
prompt ( x = 36.34), z = 2.386, p < 0.01.  This indicates that the prompt group 
discounted less, as hypothesized, potentially because the concreteness prompt 
caused the to think about both the SS and LL in a concrete way.  The 
comparison between the prompt and no-prompt groups in the large reward 
condition was not of theoretical interest, since the potentially abstract-construal-
inducing nature of the large rewards would interfere with the intended concrete-
construal-inducing nature of the prompt. 
3.1.3.4 Effect of reward size on BIF score.  Among participants in the no-
concreteness-prompt conditions, the BIF scores of those choosing between 
larger amounts of money ( x = 12.20) were significantly higher than those 
choosing among smaller amounts of money ( x =10.43), t(74)=-2.205, p = 0.016.  
As higher BIF scores indicate more abstract, higher-level thinking, these results 
support the hypothesis that choosing among larger amounts of money leads to 
more abstract thinking. 
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3.1.3.5 Secondary analyses. Interesting analyses not central to the main 
aims of this study can also be performed with these data.  First, a participant‟s 
degree of delay discounting could not be predicted from his BIF score – the 
correlation between the two was not significant for any condition.  Second, our 
prompt, which was intended to induce concrete construals, did not significantly 
change BIF scores.  These null findings are a potential cause for concern, and 
prompted Study 2, where another attempt was made to invoke concrete 
construals.  
 
3.1.4 Discussion   
The results of the study appear to generally support the two hypotheses 
the study was designed to test: (1) that delay discounting can be (at least partly) 
explained by differences in how the SS and LL are construed and (2) that the 
magnitude effect can be (at least partly) explained by differences in how people 
construe small versus large amounts of money.  However, because our 
manipulation, which was designed to induce lower-level construal, did not result 
in a change in BIF scores, we were concerned that the manipulation did not do 
what we intended it to – perhaps it swayed discounting behavior through another 
means.  In fact, it can be argued that, according to CLT, our manipulation 
induced higher-level construal because it prompted people to think of their goals 
for the money.  In CLT, goals are thought to be related to higher-level construal 
(Trope & Liberman, 2000).  But, since the BIF scores were not pushed toward 
the abstract side by our manipulation, this is also questionable.  So, to 
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investigate this further, Study 2 was constructed, where a different manipulation, 
also designed to evoke lower-level construal, was used.  
Another alternative potential explanation for our results is that the prompt 
caused people to be more thoughtful and deliberate in their decision making, and 
required them to explicitly consider their future wants and needs.  This may have 
bridged the intrapersonal empathy gap, thereby leading to less discounting.  Or, 
the prompt may have preferentially engaged System 2 processes, also leading to 
less discounting.  Neither of these theories would have predicted that the prompt 
would change BIF scores (and, in fact, such a change was not seen).  Thus, 
Studies 5 and 8, discussed later, were intended to explore these explanations 
further. 
 
3.2 Study 2: Inducing concrete construals II: Photos and graphs 
3.2.1 Overview  
Study 2 was designed as a follow-up to Study 1.  In this study, we 
continued to pursue the hypothesis that differences in how the SS and LL are 
construed can at least partially explain delay discounting.  Again, in this study, 
participants made a single decision between a SS and LL, and we attempted to 
sway the decisions of some participants by inducing them to think in a more 





 3.2.2.1 Participants.  One hundred sixteen students in the Introductory 
Psychology Subject Pool at the University of Michigan participated in the study 
for class credit.   
 3.2.2.2 Procedure.  Each participant made a single decision between a 
hypothetical $60 that could be received “today” and a hypothetical $100 that 
could be received “one year from today.” The amounts were changed from the 
SS = $68, LL = $100 used in Study 1, for two reasons.  First, we noticed that 
people tended to prefer the SS rather than being equally split between the SS 
and LL, which was our goal for the control condition.  Second, making this 
change made constructing the photo stimuli (discussed below) simpler.   
 Each participant was randomly assigned to one of three conditions.  In the 
control condition, participants simply indicated their choice of the SS or LL.  In 
the “photo” condition, when participants were presented with the decision, they 
were also presented with photographs of the rewards in cash, each with a 






Figure 4: Stimuli presented to participants in the “photo” condition. (Note: the 
photographs above are reduced in size relative to those actually used in this 
study.) 
The goal of the photographs was to induce a concrete, low-level construal 
of the rewards.  The fan-style display was chosen because it is a naturalistic way 
to display amounts of money. The $20 denomination was chosen because it is 
very familiar to our participants (i.e., college students may not have much 
experience with, e.g., $100 bills).  However, we were concerned that the 
photographs may change discounting behavior by simply emphasizing the 
difference in the amounts of the rewards.  Thus, a “graph” condition was added 
as a second sort of control condition.  In the graph condition, the photos in Figure 




Figure 5: Stimuli presented to participants in the “graph” condition. (Note: the 
graphs above are reduced in size relative to those actually used in this study.) 
The goal of the graphs was to communicate the difference in the amounts 
of the rewards without inducing concrete construal of money.  We expected, if 
anything, that the graphs would induce abstract construal, as graphs present 
conceptual information extracted from its typical concrete context. 
After choosing the SS or LL, all participants indicated the strength of their 
preference by moving a slider to a point on a continuous scale that ranged from “I 
am indifferent between the two options” and “I strongly prefer the option I chose.” 
 
3.2.3 Results 
3.2.3.1 Scoring.  A “discounting score” from -100 to 100 was calculated as 
in Study 1. 
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3.2.3.2 Effect of condition on discounting.  There was no effect of 
condition on the mean discounting score.  However, the photo and graph stimuli 
appear to have had a (non-significant) polarizing effect, with participants in those 
two conditions reporting stronger preferences for their choice (regardless of 
whether they chose the SS or LL) than those in the control condition.   
 
3.2.4 Discussion 
 Unfortunately, the correct interpretation of these results is unclear:  Either 
our attempt to manipulate construal level was unsuccessful, or CLT is not an 
important contributor to delay discounting behavior.  However, because there are 
reasonable alternative explanations for the results found in Study 1 that would 
not be invalidated by the null results in this study (e.g., System 2 activation, 
increasing empathy with future self), these alternative explanations are pursued 
further in Studies 4, 5, and 8. 
 
3.3 Study 3: Taxing self control I: Crossing out “e”s 
3.3.1 Overview  
Study 3 was designed to test the dual-systems competition hypothesis, 
detailed in section 2.8.  Specifically, the aim was to test the “self-control” 
mechanism proposed, using an ego depletion paradigm.  According to ego 
depletion theory, self-control is a limited resource (e.g., Muraven & Baumeister, 
2000).  Many studies have tested this theory using a paradigm wherein 
participants complete a first task that requires a lot of (or a little/no) self-control, 
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and performance on a subsequent, quite dissimilar, self-control task is measured.  
Participants required to exert self-control on the first task showed a major 
decrement in performance on the second task relative to a control group (e.g., 
Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Muraven, Tice, & Baumeister, 
1998). 
According to ego depletion theory, a process requires self-control if the 
person must override simple or automatic responses and effortfully implement a 
different response (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000).  Delay discounting behavior is 
plausibly such a process. To test this idea, delay discounting decisions followed 
a self-control-depleting (vs. non-depleting) task.  If the depleted group showed 
increased discounting relative to the non-depleted group, this would be support 
for the idea that discounting delayed outcomes is a self-control failure. 
  
3.3.2 Method 
 3.3.2.1 Participants. One hundred forty-five students in the Introductory 
Psychology Subject Pool at the University of Michigan participated in the study 
for class credit.   
 3.3.2.2 Procedure.   Participants were randomly assigned to the “non-
depleted” group or the “depleted” group.  For the first task, participants were 
presented with two pages of text, and instructions that varied by condition.  The 
non-depleted group was instructed to cross out the letter “e” each time it 
occurred on both pages of text.  The depleted group was instructed to cross out 
the letter “e” each time it occurred on the first page of text.  For the second page, 
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they were asked to cross out the letter “e” each time it occurred unless it was 
next to a vowel or one letter away from a vowel.  This manipulation has been 
used successfully in ego depletion studies (e.g., Baumeister et al., 1998); the 
task is designed to make the “depleted” group develop an automatic response 
(crossing out every “e”) on the first page, and then require them to override that 
automatic response on the second page, “using up” self-control.   
 For the second task, participants made a series of binary choices between 
hypothetical SS and LL rewards, using the delay discounting “web” shown in 
Figure 6, adapted from Critchfield and Atteberry (2003).  The web is used to 
determine each participant‟s indifference point (present subjective value) for 
$100 in one year.  A lower indifference point indicates more delay discounting. 
 
3.3.3 Results 
 3.3.3.1 Excluded participants.  Eleven participants were excluded from 
analysis for failure to follow the web instructions (e.g., filling in an answer for 
every box, only filling in an answer for one box, etc.).  Four participants were 
excluded for showing negative discounting (indicating a preference for $100 in 
one year over $100 right now).  A total of 130 participants were used for analysis. 
 3.3.3.2 Effect of depletion manipulation on discounting.  The non-depleted 
group ( x = 53.85,  = 27.23) and depleted group ( x = 52.97,  = 29.21) did not 





On this page, you‟ll be asked to make some simple decisions. Each decision you make will determine what decision you‟ll 
be asked to think about next. There are no right or wrong answers; we are only interested in what seems best to you in 
each box. Please answer as honestly as you can. All of the choices involve money amounts. In each box, one money 
amount is offered now, and the other would be paid after some wait.  Begin at the far left. After answering each question 
by filling in the circle next to your choice, follow the curved line from your answer to the next box. Eventually, you‟ll 
reach a box that leads nowhere else. When you reach this box, fill in the circle next to your choice and then go on to the 
next page or packet. 
 
 






 The fact that our ego-depletion manipulation did not increase the 
discounting rate in the predicted way indicates that delay discounting may not be 
a self-control process.  However, it is possible that the difference in depletion 
between the conditions was not sufficient to elicit a significant difference in 
discount rate.  In some ego depletion studies, rather than giving the “non-
depleted” group instructions like the ones used in this study, that group simply 
typed a paragraph (Muraven, Shmueli, & Burkley, 2006), or were given no task at 
all (Tice, Baumeister, Shmueli, & Muraven, 2007).  Using a control condition of 
this nature would surely lead to a greater difference in ego depletion between the 
two groups, since the “non-depleted” group‟s task would be considerably easier 
than the one we used in this study.  Such a study may be fruitful to conduct in the 
future. 
 
3.4 Study 4: Taxing self control II: Discounting over several hundred 
questions  
3.4.1 Overview  
 Study 4 was designed with two major goals in mind.  First, this study was 
another attempt to test the question of whether delay discounting is a self-control 
process, as in Study 3.  Here, we aimed to deplete participants‟ supply of self-
control by having participants make several hundred binary choices between 
various SS and LL rewards; decision making itself is thought to deplete self-
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control (Baumeister, Vohs, & Tice, 2007).  We predicted that decisions made 
early in the study session would indicate less delay discounting than decisions 
made later in the study session, due to depletion of self-control.  We expected 
that at the end of the study, people would be less able to suppress the urge to 
choose the SS.  
 An incidental aim of this study was to assess the adequacy of typical 
research methodology in delay discounting studies.  A common method of 
assessing discounting rates involves asking participants to make several 
hundred binary choices (“typically more than 400” per Madden et al., 2003, p. 
140).  Thus, finding that the discount rate increases with the number of questions 
answered would be quite problematic for this methodology. 
 The second major goal of this study was to check for associations 
between certain personality variables and delay discounting rate.  Investigations 
of this sort have received very little attention from delay discounting researchers.  
But we maintain that such explorations could provide critical clues about the 
psychological mechanisms underlying delay discounting, particularly for the dual-
systems hypothesis and the intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis.  In this study, 
we looked at four measures (Actively Open-minded Thinking, Need for Cognition, 
SAT/ACT scores, and the Rational-Experiential Inventory) that are shown to be 
associated with the ability to correctly solve problems when the correct answer 
requires purposefully overriding an initial conclusion (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
Stanovich, 1999).  That is, they are associated with the ability to allow System 2, 
rather than System 1, to “answer the question.”  If it were the case that scores on 
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these measures were negatively correlated with discounting rate, this would be 
evidence that successfully discounting less requires the overriding of an initial 
response.  It is also plausible that people scoring highly on a measure of 
intellectual engagement such as Need for Cognition may also have superior 
intrapersonal empathy because they are more likely to engage in the additional 
cognitive work necessary to put themselves in their future selves‟ shoes. 
 
3.4.2 Method 
 3.4.2.1 Participants. Eighty students in the Introductory Psychology 
Subject Pool at the University of Michigan participated in the study for class 
credit.   
 3.4.2.2 Procedure.   In order to encourage participants to remain engaged 
and attentive for the several hundred choices they would make in this study, 
participants were informed that some participants would have one of their 
choices selected at random to be honored with real money.  The procedure for 
this was as follows: Each participant would choose a number, 1-6, to be their 
“winning number”.  If, at the end of the study, the participant rolled two dice and 
both landed on that number, one of their choices would be selected at random.  
If, for that choice, the participant selected the SS, a check for the appropriate 
amount would be issued that day.  If the participant chose the LL, a check for the 
appropriate amount would be issued after the indicated delay.  Participants were 
given the details of this scheme, both verbally by the experimenter and in the 
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form of a “contract” signed by the experimenter, the supervising professor, and 
the participant.   
 The participants then made 459 binary choices between various SS and 
LL rewards, in a set of nine blocks.  Each block represented a different delay.  
The length of the delay for a certain block was randomized according to Table 2 
(e.g., if a person was assigned a delay of 37 days for Block 1, she would have a 
delay of 39 days for block 5). 
Block 
# 
Trial #s Delay 
1 1-51 37 or 39 days  
2 52-102 9 or 10 days  
3 103-153 225 or 227 days 
4 154-204 4 or 5 days  
5 205-255 37 or 39 days  
6 256-306 9 or 10 days  
7 307-357 225 or 227 days 
8 358-408 4 or 5 days 
9 409-459 38 days 
Table 2: Block design of Study 4 
Within each block, participants chose between a LL of $200 to be received after 
the delay, and a SS that started at $200.  For each new question, the SS was 
decreased incrementally until it was $1, then it was increased incrementally until 
it was again $200.  This yielded 51 questions per block. 
 Next, because we were concerned about how believable it would be to 
participants that they had a chance for one of their choices to be honored with 
real money, we asked the following three questions as manipulation checks: 
To what extent do you believe that you will be given the opportunity to play the dice roll 
as described at the beginning of the study?    To make your rating, use a scale where  1 
= I am certain that it will NOT happen (i.e., I believe the experimenter was lying)  10 = I 
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am certain that it will happen (i.e., I believe the experimenter was telling the truth)  Feel 
free to choose a number in between as appropriate.    Please make a rating on the scale 
below by clicking on a number. 
 
If you ARE given the opportunity to play the dice roll as described, how likely do you think 
it is that you will WIN the dice roll? That is, how likely do you think it is that both your dice 
will roll the winning number you chose?    To make your rating, use a scale where  1 = I 
am certain that I will win the dice roll  10 = I am certain that I will NOT win the dice roll  
Feel free to choose a number in between as appropriate.    Please make a rating on the 
scale below by clicking on a number. 
 
If you DO win the dice roll (that is, if both dice roll your winning number), how likely do 
you think it is that you will have one of your money choices honored with real money as 
described at the beginning of the study?    To make your rating, use a scale where  1 = I 
am certain that it will NOT happen (i.e., I believe the experimenter was lying)  10 = I am 
certain that it will happen (i.e., I believe the experimenter was telling the truth)  Feel free 
to choose a number in between as appropriate.    Please make a rating on the scale 
below by clicking on a number. 
 Next, participants completed (in random order) the four scales discussed 
in the overview (the Need for Cognition scale from Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & 
Jarvis, 1996; the Rational-Experiential Inventory from Pacini & Epstein, 1999; 
and an Actively Open-minded Thinking scale from Macpherson & Stanovich, 
2007).  They also completed a numeracy scale (Lipkus, Samsa, & Rimer, 2001) 
as we suspected that ability to interpret numerical information may interact with 
delay discounting in the way that it interacts with decisions involving risk (Peters 
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 3.4.3.1 Excluded participants.  This study was (intentionally) monotonous, 
so, despite the potential for real payment, we were concerned with our 
participants rushing through the study or failing to be sufficiently attentive.  Two 
classes of participants were excluded because of apparent inattention.  Ten 
participants were excluded for displaying negative discounting (i.e., indicating 
that they would prefer to receive $200 after a delay over $200 immediately) in 
more than one block.  An additional three participants were excluded because of 
marked nonmonotonicity in their responses (they did not consistently value 
rewards less as delay increased).  These latter participants were identified by 
fitting the hyperbolic discounting equation to each participant‟s data (for all 9 
blocks) using nonlinear regression with k as a free parameter (as in, e.g., 
Johnson & Bickel, 2002).  This provided an estimate of k as well as residual sum 
of squares (RSS) for each participant.  The three excluded participants had RSS 
of over 20,000.  The average RSS was 3418.21.  A total of 67 participants 
remained for use in analysis.   
 3.4.3.2 Effect of number of questions on discounting.  If answering several 
hundred questions changed discounting rates, the greatest difference in 
discounting rates should be observed by comparing Block 1 to Block 9. A k value 
was determined for each participant for both Block 1 and Block 9.    Because the 
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distribution of these k values was highly skewed and contained potential outliers, 
the nonparametric Mann-Whitney U test was used to compare k values at Block 
1 (mean = 0.0355, median = 0.0295) and Block 9 (mean = 0.0365, median = 
0.0292).  No difference in k values was detected, U = 2133.00, p = 0.620. 
 3.4.3.3 Correlation between discounting and individual difference 
measures.  We examined correlations between the overall k value for each 
participant (using data from all 9 blocks) and participants‟ scores on the individual 
differences measures.  Since the overall k values were highly skewed and 
contained potential outliers, the nonparametric Spearman‟s rho measure was 
used.  Table 3 presents the correlations between overall k and each individual 
differences measure.  The Rational-Experiential Inventory provided both a 
Rational score and an Experiential score (each score indicates a preference for 
thinking in the specified way, with “Rational” scores mapping onto System 2, and 
“Experiential” scores mapping onto System 1); these were analyzed separately.  
The N for ACT scores is lower than 67 (the number of otherwise usable 
participants as discussed above) because several participants did not report an 
ACT score. 













0.041 -0.173 -0.151 0.080 -0.021 -0.216 
Sig. (1-
tailed) 
0.372 0.081 0.111 0.260 0.433 0.060 
N 67 67 67 67 67 53 
Table 3: Spearman’s rho correlations between individual difference measures 
and overall k. 
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 The correlations between overall k and Need for Cognition as well as 
between overall k and ACT scores are in the predicted direction (i.e., higher ACT 
scores and more of a need for cognition are associated with less delay 
discounting) and are approaching significance.   
 
3.4.4 Discussion 
 The fact that no change in discounting behavior was observed across 
several hundred questions further detracts from the ego depletion hypothesis.  
But, this same result also alleviates concerns about the appropriateness of delay 
discounting measures that use several hundred questions.  
 The near-significant negative correlations between the discounting 
parameter, k, and Need for Cognition and ACT scores could be interpreted as 
supporting the dual-systems hypothesis, as we know that high Need for 
Cognition and ACT scores are positively correlated with the ability to correctly 
solve problems when answering correctly requires effortfully overriding an initial 
incorrect conclusion (Pacini & Epstein, 1999; Stanovich, 1999).  These results 
also appear to support the intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis, as people 
scoring highly on measures of intellectual ability and engagement may plausibly 
be more willing and able to consider their future needs and wants.  Study 5 was 
designed to further explore the intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis. 
 
3.5 Study 5: Ease and difficulty 
3.5.1 Overview  
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As discussed in section 2.6, it has been established that that there is a 
negative correlation between a person‟s tendency to think about the future and 
his discounting rate, which supports the intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis 
(Adams & Nettle, 2009).  Further support for that hypothesis would be seen if 
discount rates could be manipulated by making future wants and needs easier or 
more difficult to bring to mind.  Study 1 was a start down this path – we showed 
that asking people to think about how they would spend the SS and LL made 
people more likely to choose the LL.  It is plausible that this occurred because we 
caused them to consider their future wants and needs more than they otherwise 
would have.  However, it is also possible that the change in discounting behavior 
we observed was due to changes in construal level instead.   
 In this study, we used a different tactic to manipulate discount rates: one 
that, if effective, would support the intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis but not 
the differences in construal level hypothesis.  In this well-known method, used 
heavily by Schwarz and colleagues (see Schwarz, 1998, for a review), the 
subjective ease with which instances of a class come to mind is manipulated.  A 
person could be asked to list a few instances from a class, which leaves her 
feeling that it is easy to generate instances.  Or, the person could be asked to list 
many instances, which leaves her feeling that it is difficult to generate instances.  
This metacognitive feeling of ease or difficulty gives rise to different judgments 
about that class, per the availability heuristic.  If it feels easy to generate 
instances, the person concludes that the class is well-populated.  If it feels 
difficult to generate instances, the person concludes that the class is not well-
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populated (Tversky & Kahneman 1973).  In this study, we manipulated the 
feeling of ease or difficulty our participants had about generating uses for the SS 
or LL, and observed the effects of this manipulation on discounting behavior.   
 
3.5.2 Method 
 3.5.2.1 Participants. Two hundred students in the Introductory Psychology 
Subject Pool at the University of Michigan participated in the study for class 
credit. 
 3.5.2.2 Procedure.   Participants were randomly assigned to one of five 
conditions, described in Table 4.  All participants were first presented with a 
hypothetical choice between receiving $60 today and receiving $100 in a year.  
Before making the choice, participants in the 3LL, 12LL, 3SS, and 12SS  
conditions were asked to list ways they might use one of the rewards, as 
described in Table 4.   These manipulations were designed to cause the 
participant to make the respective metacognitive inferences listed in Table 4.  We 
hypothesized that participants in the 12LL and 3SS conditions would discount 
similarly to control participants, reflecting the notion that it is typically easy to 
think of present desires and difficult to think of future desires.  We expected that 
participants in the 3LL condition would discount less than control participants, 
demonstrating that when it feels easier to think of future wants and needs, people 
are more apt to aim to serve those wants and needs by choosing the LL.  The 
12SS condition was added for the sake of completeness; ideally, generating 12 
uses for the SS would cause participants to find it difficult to think of present 
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desires, but we were dubious that participants could actually be convinced that 
they had few present desires.   
 Note that in both the 3LL and 12LL conditions, the lists themselves contain 
the same sort of information, so there should be no differences in construal level.  
However, the metacognitive feeling of ease/difficulty would be different, which 
could plausibly lead to a change in discounting behavior.  Additionally, such a 
change in behavior could not be accounted for by other theories of discounting, 
such as the uncertainty hypothesis.   
 Participants who did the list-generating exercise reported how difficult the 
task was on a 7-point scale from “very difficult” to “very easy.”  Then, all 
participants indicated their choice of the SS or LL, and indicated the strength of 
their preference by moving a slider to a point on a continuous scale that ranged 
from “I am indifferent between the two options” (assigned a preference score of 
“0”) and “I strongly prefer the option I chose” (assigned a preference score of 
“100”).  Finally, participants reported their sex, year in school, present annual 
income, and anticipated annual income one year from the present.   
Condition The participant is 
asked to… 





3LL List 3 ways he/she would 
spend the LL 




12LL List 12 ways he/she 
would spend the LL 
“I have few future 
wants/needs” 
No change or 
slightly more delay 
discounting 
3SS List 3 ways he/she would 
spend the SS 
“I have many 
present 
wants/needs” 
No change or 
slightly more delay 
discounting 
12SS List 12 ways he/she 
would spend the SS 
(potentially) “I have 
few present 
wants/needs” 




Control -- -- No change 
Table 4: Design of Study 5 
   
3.5.3 Results 
3.5.3.1 Scoring. A “discounting score” from -100 to 100 was calculated as 
in Study 1. 
3.5.3.2 Manipulation checks.  Participants reported that, as expected, the 
12LL list task was more difficult than the 3LL list task (t(64) = 6.705, p < 0.001) 
and the 12SS list task was more difficult than the 3SS list task (t(98) = 8.767, p 
<0.001).   
3.5.3.3 Effect of condition on discounting.  Because the discounting scores 
were non-normally distributed, a Kruskal-Wallis test was used.  The conditions 
did not differ on discounting rate, KW(4) = 2.236, p =.693.   
 3.5.3.4 Relationship between task difficulty and discounting.  Because the 
discounting scores were non-normally distributed, the correlations reported here 
are Spearman‟s rho.  Within the 3SS (R(48) = 0.253, p = 0.01) and 12SS (R(52) 
= 0.192, p = 0.037) conditions, there were significant correlations between 
reported task difficulty and discounting, in the predicted direction.  That is, in 
these conditions, participants who reported more difficulty thinking of present 
wants and needs were more likely to choose the LL.    This correlation was not 





 Despite the effect the list-generating manipulation has had in many other 
domains, we were not able to use it to cause changes in discounting behavior.  
However, the fact that reported difficulty with the task correlated with discounting 
behavior in the SS conditions lends some modest support to the theory, or at 
least an isotope of it.  The intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis predicted, “the 
more difficult it is to think of future desires, the more discounting will occur.” What 
was demonstrated in this study was, “the more difficult it is to think of present 
desires, the less discounting will occur.”  However, it is unclear why there was no 
relationship between reported task difficulty and discounting behavior in the LL 
conditions. 
Also it is surprising that in Study 1, when we asked people to list three 
ways they would use both the SS and LL, discounting rates changed relative to a 
control condition, but in this study when people listed three ways they would use 




3.6 Study 6: Anticipated income 
3.6.1 Overview  
 As discussed in section 2.1.1, one reason people may discount is that 
they anticipate that their financial situation will improve over time.  Thus, 
receiving the SS at a sooner time would provide more utility than receiving the LL 
at a later time.  To empirically test this idea, we studied two populations: college 
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juniors and college seniors.  While college juniors presumably would not expect 
much financial improvement over the course of a year, college seniors would 
likely anticipate full-time employment and thus a significant jump in income.  If 
these two groups differ in discounting behavior, this would be evidence that 
anticipated financial improvement plays a role in delay discounting.  In this study, 
college juniors and seniors first answered delay discounting questions, and then 
reported their current annual income and their anticipated income one year in the 
future.   
 
3.6.2 Method 
 3.6.2.1 Recruitment. Participants for this study were recruited in two 
different ways.  First, the “snowball” method was used.  I e-mailed friends and 
colleagues with the survey information and an appeal asking the recipient to 
forward the message to any college juniors and seniors they knew.  Second, an 
e-mail was sent to a random selection of two thousand University of Michigan 
juniors and seniors. 
 3.6.2.2 Participants.   Two hundred seventy-nine people participated in 
this study.  Participants were not compensated for their participation. 
 3.6.2.3 Procedure.   Participants first completed a computerized version of 
the delay discounting “web” used in Study 3 (Figure 6).  The web was used to 
determine each participant‟s indifference point (present subjective value) for 
$100 in one year.  Then, participants reported their sex, year in school, 
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anticipated graduation date, their present college, their current annual income, 
and their anticipated annual income one year from the present.    
 
3.6.3 Results  
 3.6.3.1 Excluded Participants.  Of the 279 participants, seven were 
excluded for failing to complete the survey.  Thirty-four were excluded because 
they were not college juniors or seniors.  The responses from the remaining 238 
participants were examined to determine whether their reported present and 
future incomes were consistent with our assumptions.  Specifically, we 
considered a participant to be a “financial junior” if each of the following held: 
1. The participant reported being a college junior. 
2. The participant provided both present and anticipated future income. 
3. Anticipated future income was not more than 25% greater than present 
income. 
4. Anticipated future income was not lower than present income. 
We considered a participant to be a “financial senior” if each of the following held: 
1. The participant reported being a college senior. 
2. The participant provided both present and anticipated future income. 
3. Anticipated future income was at least 50% higher than present income. 
Eighty of the 132 college juniors qualified as “financial juniors.”  Fifty-seven of the 
106 college seniors qualified as “financial seniors.”   
 3.6.3.2 Reported Income.  Financial juniors reported an average present 
income of $4,298.00, and an average anticipated future income of $4,373.85.  
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Financial seniors reported an average present income of $4,578.95, and an 
average anticipated future income of $33,553.00.  
 3.6.3.3 Effect of year on discounting.  Financial juniors and seniors did not 
differ on their present subjective value for $100 in one year (t(121) = 0.508, p = 
0.612).   
 3.6.3.4 Effect of income on discounting.  Neither present nor anticipated 
future income correlated significantly with discounting behavior, either across all 
participants or within groups. 
 
3.6.4 Discussion 
 Our failure to find an effect based upon year discredits the idea that 
people make discounting decisions based upon anticipated future income, at 
least in typical circumstances.  Perhaps we would have seen an effect if we first 
asked about present and anticipated future income, and then asked the 
discounting questions.  However, people are not usually made to consider their 
present and future financial states before making discounting-type decisions. 
 Unfortunately, we were unable to replicate the finding that discount rates 
are correlated with present income.  This may be because our discounting 
measure was insufficiently sensitive, or because there simply was not enough 
variation in present income.  
 
 




 As discussed in section 2.6, delay discounting behavior could result from 
devoting relatively little thought to one‟s future wants/desires.  Another way of 
framing this is that discounting is caused by being preoccupied by present 
wants/desires.  It is plausible that discounting behavior is positively correlated 
with field dependence as measured by such tasks as the rod-and-frame test (cf. 
Witkin & Goodenough, 1977).  Both concern a tendency to be primarily 
concerned with one‟s immediate surroundings, and being unable to abstract 
away salient information.  As field dependence is a well-established 
psychological concept, relating to such wide-ranging constructs as learning 
styles, culture, and social anxiety (e.g., DeBell & Crystal, 2005; Goodenough, 
1976), detecting a relationship between it and discounting could prove fruitful.  In 
this study, the relationship between field dependence and discounting behavior 




 3.7.2.1 Participants.  Ninety-five students in the Introductory Psychology 
Subject Pool at the University of Michigan participated in the study for class 
credit. 
 3.7.2.2 Procedure. Participants completed a measure of field dependence 
(the Group Embedded Figures Test, Witkin, Oltman, Raskin, & Karp, 2002), a 
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measure of visuospatial ability (the Paper Folding Task; Ekstrom, French, & 
Harman, 1976), and the delay discounting web as in Studies 3 and 6. 
 
3.7.3 Results 
 3.7.3.1 Excluded participants.  Nine participants were excluded for failing 
to follow the directions of the delay discounting web.  Eight participants were 
excluded for showing no discounting or negative discounting.   
 3.7.3.2 Relationship between field dependence and discounting behavior.  
There was no significant correlation between field dependence and discounting 
behavior, both before (r = 0.03, p = 0.8) and after (r = -0.013, p = 0.9) controlling 
for visuospatial ability. 
 
3.7.4 Discussion 
 The null results of this study indicate that a tendency to be distracted by 




3.8 Study 8: System 1/System 2 priming 
3.8.1 Overview  
 As discussed in section 2.8, there may be multiple mechanisms whereby 
dual-system competition leads to delay discounting. The first is that discounting 
decisions involve self-control: one has an urge to choose the SS but can 
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effortfully override this urge by using some of one‟s limited self-control resource.  
The results of Studies 3 and 4 cast doubt on this mechanism when tasks 
designed to use up self-control failed to increase discounting.  However, the 
second mechanism – that discounting depends upon the relative activations of 
System 1 and System 2 – remained untested.  In this study, we attempted to 
preferentially activate System 1 or System 2 through a priming task before 
participants made discounting decisions.   
 
3.8.2 Method 
 3.8.2.1 Participants. Ninety students in the Introductory Psychology 
Subject Pool at the University of Michigan participated in the study for class 
credit. 
 3.8.2.2 Procedure. Participants were randomly assigned to the “System 1” 
or “System 2” condition.  All participants first completed a sentence-unscrambling 
priming task, then completed two delay discounting measures.  The literature 
provided no clues on how to reliably induce System 1 versus System 2 thinking, 
so a sentence-unscrambling priming task was constructed for this study.  The 
priming method adapted from a similar-style manipulation used by Bargh, Chen, 
and Burrows (1996), in whose studies participants were primed to be, among 
other things, rude or polite.   
In the priming task used in the present experiment, participants were 
presented 20 sets of 4-6 words.  For each set of words, the participants were 
asked to change the order of the words to make a grammatically correct 
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sentence.  The content of these sentences varied by condition.  In the System 1 
condition, ten of the sentences contained a “keyword” related to System 1 
thinking, such as “hunch,” “automatically,” and “emotional.”  The remaining ten 
sentences contained neutral content.  In the System 2 condition, ten of the 
sentences contained a keyword related to System 2 thinking, such as “slowly,” 
“thoughtful,” and “rational.”  The remaining ten sentences were the same neutral 
sentences as in the other condition.  The order of the twenty sentences was 
randomized for each participant 
 Then, participants completed the same discounting task as in Studies 1, 2, 
and 6 (choosing between $60 today and $100 in a year, and indicating their 
degree of preference).  Finally, participants completed a computerized version of 
the delay discounting “web” as in Studies 3, 6, and 7.  
 
3.8.3 Results 
3.8.3.1 Scoring. A “discounting score” from -100 to 100 was calculated as 
in Study 1. 
3.8.3.2 Effect of condition on choice discounting task.  A Mann-Whitney U 
test was used because the discounting scores were non-normally distributed.  
There was a trend for the System 1 group to discount more ( x = 7.085,  = 
73.005) than the System 2 group ( x = -7.116,  = 66.769).  This is in the 
predicted direction, though the difference was not significant, (z = --.881, p = 
0.189).   
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3.8.3.3 Effect of condition on web discounting task.  There was no effect of 
condition on the indifference point elicited from the web discounting task.   
 
3.8.4 Discussion  
While condition had no effect on the web discounting task (which was 
always administered second, and therefore may not be affected by a short-lived 
priming-based manipulation), the trend observed in the first discounting measure 
is intriguing.  Unfortunately, time limitations preclude running additional 
participants or attempting different manipulations or dependent measures.  













4.1 General conclusions 
 The work reported in this dissertation aimed to help answer the question: 
“What causes delay discounting?”  These studies tested several distinct 
hypotheses that had previously received little or no empirical attention: economic 
reasons, differences in construal, intrapersonal empathy gap, and dual-system 
competition.  Assuming that, in each study, the manipulations each had their 
intended effect and the dependent measures adequately captured the intended 
construct, what conclusions can be drawn? 
First, per Studies 1 and 2, it appears that delay discounting is not driven 
by differences in how the SS and LL are construed.  Second, per Study 6, 
anticipated future income is apparently not a driver of discounting.  Third, per 
Studies 3 and 4, the self-control mechanism of the dual-systems hypothesis is 
most likely not implicated in discounting decisions.  In fact, after this study was 
completed, relevant data from other two other studies were discovered.  First, 
Cox (2005), in an unpublished master‟s thesis, used the same ego depletion 
manipulation, but a different delay discounting measure, and similarly failed to 
find the anticipated effect.  Second, Joireman, Balliet, Sprott, Spangenberg, and 
Schultz (2008) used a different ego depletion manipulation (controlling vs. not 
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controlling emotions while watching a video clip) as well as a different 
discounting measure.  They found the anticipated effect in only a very small 
subset of people (i.e., those who scored more than one standard deviation above 
average on the “immediate” subscale of the Consideration of Future 
Consequences scale).  Given the results of our Study 3, as well as the results of 
these other studies, it appears fairly conclusive that ego depletion plays at best a 
limited role in delay discounting. 
The verdicts on the other two theories tested are more complicated.  First, 
the role of relative system activation is ambiguous.  Study 4 showed a trend for 
Need for Cognition and ACT scores, measures thought to be associated with the 
ability to preferentially activate System 2, to be negatively correlated with 
discounting rates.  Study 8 hinted that priming System 1 (versus System 2) led to 
more discounting, though this effect was not significant and was only present in 
the first of two discounting measures. 
It is also unclear how, based on the studies reported here, to evaluate the 
intrapersonal empathy gap hypothesis.  The prompt in Study 1 could be plausibly 
interpreted as a way to increase empathy with one‟s future self, and it led to less 
discounting.  But, the similar prompts used in the LL conditions of Study 5, which 
presumably would also increase intrapersonal empathy, had no effect on 





The studies here are affected by a problem endemic to scientific (and, 
particularly, psychological) research:  I am not confident that the experimental 
manipulations accomplished what they were designed to accomplish.  For 
example, in Study 1, the fact that BIF scores did not change across prompt 
conditions causes one to suspect that the prompt manipulation was not changing 
construal level.  In Study 8, was the priming manipulation sufficient?  The design 
of the priming manipulation was original, since the literature provides no clues on 
how to preferentially induce System 1 versus System 2 activation.   
Further, I am skeptical about the adequacy of the delay discounting 
measures used.  Across the studies, three different measures of discounting 
were used, and each had some apparent problems.  In all of these measures, 
some participants expressed preferences that indicated no discounting (e.g., 
equally preferring $100 in a year and $100 today) or negative discounting 
(preferring $100 in a year over $100 now).  Do these responses indicate actual 
preferences, or simply misunderstanding or inattention?   
The web method used in Studies 3, 6, 7 and 8 was apparently confusing 
in paper form, with a non-trivial portion of participants failing to follow the 
instructions.  While this was not an issue for the computer-implemented version, 
another problem persists: apparent lack of sensitivity.  While a person‟s true 
indifference point for $100 in one year could be any value between $0 and $100, 
the web method only allowed for 22 possible endpoints.  Further, in the range 
where most people‟s responses fell ($40-60), there were only three possible 
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endpoints: $40, $50, and $60.  Perhaps if more and more-closely spaced 
endpoints were available, subtle effects may have been observable.   
The choice-and-preference discounting measure used in Studies 1, 2, 5, 
and 8 suffered from a different problem: huge variations.  While the possible 
responses ranged from -100 to 100, the average standard deviation within a 
condition across studies was 71.05.  Perhaps in some of the studies where this 
measure was used, effects would have been observed with a different measure 
but were instead washed away by incredible amounts of noise. 
The stepwise method used in Study 4 was probably the most accurate 
measure, but even here, some participants gave inconsistent (at times wildly 
inconsistent) responses.  Additionally, this measure took quite awhile to 
administer, and would not have been appropriate to capture subtle and short-
lived manipulation effects. 
 
4.3 Broader impacts and future research 
While the research presented in this dissertation cannot unequivocally 
support particular underlying causes of delay discounting, it appears that future 
research examining relative system activation and the intrapersonal empathy gap 
may be the most promising.  Are there other, more effective ways to change a 
person‟s discounting rate by manipulating either of these factors?  If so, this 
could be potentially useful in many real-world domains.  Perhaps marketers could 
preferentially engage System 1 to cause people to discount more, driving up 
indulgent and impulsive purchases?  Perhaps drug abuse counselors could help 
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clients to bridge their own intrapersonal empathy gap, reducing their tendency to 
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